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A CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM: THE RESILIENCE OF
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY DURING AMERICAN NATIONALISM
AND EXPANSION: 1810-1871
DAvID E. WILKINS*
INTRODUCTION
Judge Michael Hawkins addresses a number of important issues in his
essay on John Quincy Adams' evolving understanding and relationship with
slavery and the variegated role that law played in the politics of slavery and
the slavery of politics. The essay demonstrates the importance of human
personality in influencing and being influenced by political and legal
processes. At its heart, the Article is a legal and historical study of the moral
dimension and inherent contradictions facing Adams, in particular, and the
American Republic, in general, regarding the existence and persistence of
the institution of slavery in a nation built upon principles of universal
freedom and equality.
In my reading of Judge Hawkins analysis, I found interesting parallels
and divergences between the experience of Africans and African-
Americans with those of the indigenous nations of the Americas. One
parallel already mentioned is that of the inherent contradiction in the United
States Constitution that, on the one hand, banned the slave trade after 1808
yet respected the legality of slavery for many more years. Similarly, tribes,
through their treaty-based relationship with the United States and
preexisting status as distinctive polities, have been dealt with as sovereign
bodies, yet Congress and the courts have also asserted plenary (read:
absolute) power to terminate or restrain that sovereignty at any time.
Another parallel points to the very question of the humanity of
Africans, African-Americans, and American Indians. As Judge Hawkins
* Associate Professor of American Indian Studies, Political Science, and Law at the
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis; Ph.D., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Dr. Wilkins is a Lumbee Indian.
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notes, the British House of Commons created a commission to study the
slave trade and raised the question "whether 'the slave trade is contrary to
the laws of God and the rights of man"" In 1550-1551 at the request of
King Charles of Spain, a council of fourteen Spanish politicians and
scholars held a great debate at Valladolid between the Dominican friar
Bartolome de Las Casas and the Spanish jurist, Juan Gines de Sepulveda.
They convened to debate whether or not the application of Aristotle's
Theory of Natural Slavery applied to Indians in the New World.2
Las Casas, who had been to the Americas, was a strong advocate of
Indian rights. He had campaigned against the Spanish conquistadores who
wrought great destruction to indigenous societies through institutions like
the Encomienda that allowed Spanish landowners to enslave Indians who
were required to work the lands of their overlords. He fervently believed
that Indians were entitled to respect and should not be subjected to
enslavement. Sepulveda, on the other hand, maintained that the human
species was naturally divided into two kinds of men: (1) the civilized man,
and (2) the barbarian, who was believed to lack essential qualities.
Sepulveda believed that Indians had a "natural rudeness and inferiority"
which meant they were "born to be natural slaves."3
Finally, and to borrow from one of Judge Hawkins' colleagues, John
T. Noonan, Jr., there is also a parallel in the manner in which the political
and legal processes develop "masks" that are used to conceal the true
character of individuals and minority groups as a means to "suppress the
humanity of a participant in the process."4 The humanity of Africans and
African-Americans was "masked" in American law by being characterized
as "property." Once so characterized, they could be bartered, sold, or even
killed without the legal system actually confronting the fact that they were
human beings entitled to basic human rights and freedom.
The fields of federal Indian policy and law are also marked by a
number of masks, many of which, unfortunately for tribes, persist to this
day. These include the masks of Indian "dependency" or "wardship," the
masks that assert that Indians were "discovered" and then "conquered,"
1. MICHAEL DALY HAwKINS, John QuincyAdams and the Antebellum Maritime Slave
Trade: The Politics of Slavery and the Slavery of Politics, 25 OKLA. CITY L. REv. 4 (2000)
(quoting DAVID BRION DAvIS, SLAVERY IN THE AoE OF REVOLUTnoN 16 (1973)).
2. See LEWIS HANKE, ARISTOTLE AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1959).
3. Id. at 44.
4. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 20 (1976).
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thus reducing their rights vis-a-vis the discovering conqueror. There is also
the mask that the United States has plenary (read: absolute) authority over
tribes and their resources and rights; and the mask that tribes, by having
been "geographically incorporated" into the body politic of the United
States have thereby been "implicitly divested" of certain inherent powers
of sovereignty like the power of exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians within their borders.'
DIVERGENCES BETWEEN INDIAN NATIONS AND AFRICAN-AMERICANS
While the similarities in status and perception of the two groups in
relation to the land and American politicians are impressive, the differences
are even more remarkable. In part, this is a result of the fact that tribes
generally do not consider themselves an integral part of the pluralistic
mosaic of the American polity. Tribes perceive of themselves not only as
pre-constitutional polities, but as continuing extra-constitutional entities. As
one commentator noted when comparing African-Americans and tribal
nations: "The overriding goal of the black civil rights movement was to
achieve individual equality and individual rights as promised within the
philosophy of liberalism. Native American leaders, on the other hand, have
historically demanded recognition of their tribal rights as guaranteed by
treaties, executive agreements, and congressional statutes." The remainder
of this Article critically examines the legal-political situation created for
Native peoples by the United States Supreme Court between 1810 and
187 1. 1 begin with 1810 because in this year a Supreme Court decision first
broached, though did not directly explicate, the subject of tribal
sovereignty. My analysis ends in 1871 because in that year Congress,
through an appropriation act rider,7 unilaterally transformed the political
5. See, for example, DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JusnCE (1997), for an analysis of these and other
judicial masks from the very earliest Supreme Court decisions to the end of the twentieth
century.
6. Anne M. McCulloch, Perspectives on Native Americans, 16 POLITICAL SCIENCE:
TEACHING POLCAL SCIENCE: POLrTCS IN PERSPECTIVE 93 (Spring 1989).
7. See 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871). Over 800 treaties were negotiated with the various
Indian tribes, although the Senate ratified only about 371. See CHARLEs KAPPLER, 2 INDIAN
AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES (1904), for the official, if insufficient, collection of the
various ratified treaties. But see VINE DELORiA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE'S, 1-2
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND
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rules of the game between itself and tribal nations by attempting to
terminate the treaty process.
I conclude by asserting that in spite of or because of the incongruous
and sometimes unique principles emerging from the Supreme Court's
Indian case law during this era, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty remained
a vital concept undergirding the social and political relationship between the
tribes and the federal government. The Court's nineteenth century
depictions of tribal status, Indian treaties, state-tribal-federal relations, and
other related issues, warrant attention. Despite the purported termination of
certain characteristics of tribal sovereignty (like the recognition of the right
of tribes to negotiate new treaties after 1871), and the modification of
elements of tribal sovereignty, the Court's decisions continue to provide the
essential legal, political, and constitutional parameters necessary to develop
a comprehension of the distinctive role tribes occupy both inside and
outside the intergovernmental process.
EARLY POLITICAL RELATIONS
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to
regulate affairs with tribes. In the formative years of the United States'
development, Congress actively sought and established a clear Indian
legislative agenda. In fact, during the First Congress in 1789, four of the
initial thirteen statutes enacted dealt primarily or partially with Indian
affairs.
CONvENTIONS, 1775-1979 (1999), which supplements and dramatically expands Kappler's
work by reprinting copies of hundreds of other treaties, agreements, etc., that have not been
previously published.
In 1871, the House of Representatives, jealous of their exclusion from the treaty
process, and anxious to end the rampant graft and corruption in the Bureau of Indian Affairs
handling of treaty appropriations, succeeded in attaching a rider which sought to curtail the
negotiation of additional treaties. All previously ratified treaties and subsequent agreements
(bilateral agreements continued to be negotiated with tribes until 1914) retained legal force,
however. A good contemporary discussion on the history and legal ramifications of the
transition from treaty relations to agreement relations in found in George William Rice's
Indian Rights: 25 US.C. Sec. 71: The End of Sovereignty or a Self-Limitation of
Contractual Ability, 5 AM. INDIAN L. R. 239-53 (1977). See also the spirited senatorial
debates printed in CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess, 1098-99, 1638-48 (1870). See also
id, app. at 536-48 (1870) (Speech by Senator Eugene Casserly); id, 41st Cong., 3d Sess.,
1154, 1810-12, 1821-25 (1871).
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Within these four important sources of federal authority relating to
tribal matters are: "The power to make war (and presumably, peace); the
power to govern territories; the power to make treaties; and the power to
spend money."8 The second of the four statutes reenacted the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787. This Act contains a now famous quote which provides
"the utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their
land and property shall never be taken from them without their
consent. ... "' According to Cohen, this Act stood out as the first of "many
measures by which Congress, in administering the government of the
territories, legislated over Indian affairs with 'plenary' authority."'° Plenary
as defined by Cohen is exclusive and preemptive of state power. Congress
could not afford to be lackadaisical in establishing constructive relations
with the tribes. Tribal military power could not be wished away. Moreover,
the English, Spanish, French, and other competitive European powers
complicated matters further because each of these nation states were
competing for jurisdiction over various portions of North America. Finally,
the struggle between the national government and the individual states was
a major concern. Despite the passage of several vital laws, there was still
much uncertainty in determining how the actual tribal-federal-state-
European power relationship was to be reconciled.
The Supreme Court, initially under the sophisticated and diplomatic pen
of Chief Justice John Marshall, would be the federal institution, which
defined these broad relations. This Article provides an historical
examination of the critical events and personalities of this period, and
critically appraises the relatively few Supreme Court decisions, dealing
either explicitly or gratuitously with tribal autonomy.
Why are there so few court cases during this more than sixty year
period? There are two compelling, though disparate reasons. First, a
majority of western tribes (excluding the Five Civilized Tribes) continued
to be recognized and treated as foreign separate nations via the treaty route.
The second equally important reason focuses on the Five Civilized Tribes.
While diplomatically linked to the United States by treaties, their early and
extended contact with federal administrators, before their voluntary and
later forced removal to the Indian Territory, encouraged these tribes to
8. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 69 (Five Rings Corp. 1986)
(1942).
9. 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).
10. COHEN, supra note 8, at 69.
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develop a sophisticated constitutional form of government similar in some
respects to the structure of the United States. However, in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia in 1831, when the Cherokee Nation attempted to bring a suit
directly to the Supreme Court, they were told in explicit terms that their
"domestic-dependent" status-Justice Marshall said that they were neither
foreign nations nor constitutionally recognized states-precluded such a
legal action." Hence, the Court developed a new political status for tribal
nations but did not identify a corresponding constitutional responsibility to
protect said status because tribes were prohibited from using a direct legal
avenue of redress.
The sovereign status of tribal nations was recognized in the
Constitution, the Northwest Ordinance, and numerous treaties. However,
as noted above, the Supreme Court during this period of national formation,
expansion, and civil strife, articulated several crucial rules regarding tribal
status and the tribal-federal-state relationship. These doctrines, some
moored in colonial law, constitutional law, and international law, some
more aptly characterized as "legal fiction," remain the cornerstone
depictions of an apparently malleable tribal status that perpetuates internal,
external, intertribal, and intergovernmental tension.
MARSHALL: MASTER OF FORCEFUL EQUIVOCATION: 1810-1835
John Marshall, the third Chief Justice, is widely regarded as the most
influential individual in establishing the prestige of the Supreme Court. His
major opinions advanced federal supremacy over states' rights, established
the right ofjudicial review, and provided an extensive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause. Marshall's vaunted, if occasionally enigmatic logic, was
equally impressive in the area of Indian law. In five cases, Fletcher v. Peck
(1810), Johnson v. M'Intosh (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831),
Worcester v. Georgia (1832), and Mitchel v. United States (1835), the
Marshall Court both explicated and reinforced doctrines which form the
broad parameters of the tribal-federal-state relationship today. These cases,
in brief, defined: (1) tribal property rights; (2) tribal political status in
relation to the states; (3) tribal political status in relation to the federal
government; and (4) tribal land rights and international status.
11. See id.
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A. Fletcher v. Peck
Fletcher was the first case to abrogate a state action. However, it is
more important because it was the first Supreme Court opinion to broach
the subject of Indian property rights. In this case, commonly known as the
"Yazoo land fraud case," Justice Marshall ruled that the Georgia legislature
had a right in 1795 to sell the State's western territory, although certain
Indian tribes occupied it and retained possession of the soil.
While Indians were not parties to this suit, and although Indian land
title was not a direct issue, Marshall expressed a view in the last few
sentences of his opinion, presaging his next major Indian opinion, Johnson
v. M'Intosh. Johnson would later be misinterpreted by some jurists and
commentators as a dilution of tribal rights to land. 2
Marshall said: "The majority of the Court is of opinion that the nature
of the Indian title, which is certainly to be respected by all Courts, until it
be legitimately extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to
seisin in fee on the part of the state."'3 Seisin literally means actual
possession-in other words, the State could make an outright purchase of
tribal land. This is the first precise statement by the Court that tribal rights
are for some reason inferior to those same rights when exercised by Anglo-
Americans. Justice Johnson dissented on the issue of Georgia's title and
noted that Indians were "absolute proprietor of their soil" in which "no
other nation can be said to have the same interest." 4 Johnson's dissent
would later prove useful to the resourceful Marshall and would serve as a
foundation to Justice Marshall's eloquent and most impressive opinion on
the vitality of tribal sovereignty.
B. Johnson v. M'Intosh
Thirteen years after Fletcher, the Supreme Court returned to the
question of Indian land title in Johnson. As in Fletcher, Indians were not
directly involved as parties to this suit. This was a dispute between white
men. The specific issue, according to Marshall, was "in a great measure,
12. See Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1 AMER. BAR FOUNDATION
RES. J. 23 (1987).
13. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142-43 (1810).
14. Id. at 147.
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confined to the power of Indians to give, and of private individuals to
receive, a title which can be sustained in the courts of this country.""5
In Fletcher, Marshall devoted all of three lines to a gratuitous
description of Indian land title. By the 1820s, a strong sense of nationalism
had emerged. This is best evidenced by the issuance of the Monroe
Doctrine in which the United States defined its role in international affairs.
In Johnson, the Federal Government positioned itself in such a manner that
"Indian tribal properties became a matter of domestic policy."' 6 This is not
unusual, by itself. What is unusual, however, is the rationale given by the
Court--"the doctrine of discovery"-purporting to justify one of two
federal perspectives regarding its understanding of who held legal title to
Indian land and the public domain. Either the federal government claimed
legal ownership of the United States, or the United States merely asserted
the exclusive right to acquire Indian property by purchase or conquest.
The doctrine of discovery, as originated by Marshall, was first
employed in the former sense. European nations from the fifteenth through
the nineteenth centuries operated under the strange belief that by their mere
arrival, and because they represented Christian nations, all "discovered"
lands, occupied or not, came under the legal possession of the discovering
nation. By contrast, in Marshall's last full Indian-law decision, Worcester
v. Georgia (1832), the Chief Justice redefined "discovery" as merely an
"exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among those
who had agreed to it."' 7
In Johnson, Justice Marshall underscored the significance of such a
bizarre doctrine in an incredible concession. He noted the following:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of
an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has
been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a
country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the
great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of
15. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 572 (1823).
16. Vine Deloria, Jr., Beyond the Pale: American Indians and the Constitution, in A
LEss THAN PERFECT UNION 249, 251 (Jules Lobel ed., 1988).
17. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832). See also Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origin of the Status of the American Indian
in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 1-99 (1983), for an extensive treatment on the
"discovery" concept; and David E. Wilkins, Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of Discovery: A
Treaty-Based Reappraisal, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 277-315 (1998).
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the land, and cannot be questioned. So too, with respect to the
concomitant principle, that the Indian inhabitants are to be
considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in
peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable
of transferring the absolute title to others. However this restriction
may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized
nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the
country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of
the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and
certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice.'l
As a result of the invented concept of "discovery," tribal rights to land,
while not "entirely disregarded," were "necessarily, to a considerable
extent, impaired."19 Scholarly interpretations of the doctrines enunciated in
Johnson run from those asserting that the United States acquired fee simple
title to Indian land, meaning that Indians owned only equitable [use and
occupancy] title, as contrasted with legal ownership;" to those who posit
that the United States only gained a preemptive right to purchase Indian
land or confiscate it after a just war.2
In actuality, because of Marshall's intentional waffling, the opinion
clearly supports both views. George Decker, however, raises an interesting
point on the issue of "discovery." He notes that "[t]hey [(whites)] allowed
no room in this for any reciprocal right to follow any discovery of white
men by Indians. This fiction of a right, as against native occupants, arising
from discovery of them by white men glossed over the wrong of a forcible
intrusion."'
Fletcher and Johnson involved whites who had conflicting claims to
land formerly held by tribal nations, rather than conflicting claims between
states or the federal government and tribal groups with opposing claims to
land and sovereignty. Furthermore, "these cases did not directly confront
18. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591-92.
19. Id. at 574.
20. See, e.g., George P. Decker, Treaty Making With the Indians, 47 RESEARCHES AND
TRANSACTIONS OF THE NEW YORK STATE ARCHAEOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (1920); Vine
Deloria, Jr. The Distinctive Status of Indian Rights, in THE PLAINS INDIANs OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 237, 240 (1985).
21. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 208 (1984); Ball, supra note 12, at 24.
22. Decker, supra note 20, at 47.
20001
Oklahoma City University Law Review
the Court with questions of the political and property rights of the tribes, its
decisions only suggested answers to these problems."' Justice Marshall's
two other Indian opinions, as well as Mitchel v. US., would tackle these
fundamental questions.
C. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
The Cherokee Nation was one of the first tribal entities to successfully
attempt a fusion of ancient tribal law ways with Anglo-American legal
institutions.24 This acculturation process, in which the western legal system
was modified to Cherokee needs, was well under way by the early 1820s.
In that decade alone the Cherokees crafted a constitution loosely modeled
after that of the United States, produced a written account of their language,
and established the first tribal newspaper. ' In 1827 they formally
announced a fact-that of their political independence- which the federal
government already knew and supported, as evidenced by the fourteen
ratified treaties with the Cherokee Nation.26 The Cherokees stated that they
were an independent nation with an absolute right to their territory and
sovereignty within their boundaries.
The Cherokees declaration enraged Georgia's white population and
their government officials. Driven by the recent discovery of gold on tribal
lands, but compelled even more by their conception of state sovereignty
which they believed could not be rightfully invaded by the federal
government, much less by a tribe of Indians, the State enacted a series of
debilitating laws designed to oppress Cherokee self-government. These
Acts parceled out Cherokee lands to several counties, extended state
jurisdiction over the Cherokees, abolished Cherokee laws, and denied the
Cherokees the protection of their own laws, etc.28 The Cherokees, having
23. Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21
STAN L. REV. 500, 502 (1969).
24. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIREANDTHE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAWFROMCLANTO
COURT xi (1975).
25. See id at 103, 109.
26. See A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS MADE BY INDIAN
TRIBES wrTH THE UNrED STATES 3-31 (1973).
27. See Burke, supra note 23, at 503.
28. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 7-8 (1831).
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failed in their appeals to President Jackson29 and the Congress," proceeded
to file suit in the Supreme Court against Georgia. The Cherokees prayed for
an injunction to restrain Georgia's execution of those laws, which the
Cherokees said, were in direct violation of "solemn treaties repeatedly
made and still in force. 31
Justice Marshall rendered the Court's fragmented and ambivalent
opinion on March 18, 1831. While acknowledging that a more fascinating
case "can scarcely be imagined," Marshall first noted that the Court had to
ascertain whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case.32 Since the Cherokees
were suing as an original plaintiff, the Court had to decide whether the
Cherokee Nation constituted a "foreign state. 33
After a lengthy opinion, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "the majority
is of opinion that an Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a
foreign state ... and cannot maintain an action in the Courts of the United
States."34 If they were not a foreign state, then, what were they? Marshall
refused to accept either of the opposing opinions at the time-tribes as
either foreign nations or tribes as subject nations. Had he declared them
subject nations they would have been at the mercy of the states; had he
more accurately acknowledged them as foreign nations they would have
been independent of federal control.3"
Instead, the inventive Chief Justice generated an extra-constitutional
political status for tribes by characterizing them as "domestic dependent
nations."36 This diluted "national" status has had a lasting effect on tribes
in their quest for legal redress. First, it effectively served to preclude tribes
from bringing original actions to the Supreme Court because tribes were not
considered "constitutional" states. Second, since they were denied status as
"foreign nations" they were effectively barred from benefits accorded to
fully recognized sovereigns under international law.
29. See Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message, in I THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS 1790-1966, at 294, 309 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966) (1829)
[hereinafter _ Israel].
30. See H.R. REP. No. 227 (1830).
31. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 20.
35. See Burke, supra note 23, at 514.
36. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
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Building upon the deceptive legal construct of "discovery," Marshall
said that tribes "occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of
possession ceases."37 Marshall was not through, however. He then wrote
several lines containing inaccurate adjectives that would later form the basis
of additional "masks" that would prove detrimental to tribes. Marshall
alleged that "[m]eanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." '
Justice Marshall's deeply political opinion was in certain respects
similar to his ruling in Marbury v. Madison.39 In that case, facing the
resistance of a popular president, and not hindered by the defense counsel's
logic, Marshall spoke powerfully on the plaintiff's claims, chided the
President, but avoided the "threatened disobedience of the Court's decree
by dismissing the case for want ofjurisdiction."'4
The Court's decision in Cherokee Nation was extremely splintered. The
six Justices (Justice Duvall was absent) presented four diverse sets of views
on tribal status. Justice Johnson held that tribes lacked sovereignty but
possessed an inherent political power that could mature into sovereignty
later. Justice Baldwin simply said that tribes had no sovereignty. Justice
Thompson and Justice Story believed that tribal status paralleled that of
foreign nations. Chief Justice Marshall and Justice McLean said that tribes
were domestic-dependent nations.4
On the question ofjurisdiction, the majority was against the Cherokees.
On the merits, however, the Court divided 4-2 for the Cherokees. The Chief
Justice, in fact, insinuated that he sided with the minority on the merits, (he,
in fact, encouraged Justice Thompson and Justice Story to write out their
dissent). Justice Marshall even suggested a method of getting a case
properly before the court in the future.42 Marshall would have the
opportunity to vent these feelings even sooner than he anticipated.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
40. Burke, supra note 23, at 514.
41. See VINE DELoRIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JusTIcE 31 (1983).
42. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20; see also Burke, supra note 23, at 515;
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 41, at 31-32.
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D. Worcester v. Georgia
Worcester is often hailed as the most persuasive and elaborate
pronouncement of the federal government's treaty-based relationship with
tribal nations. Interestingly, tribes were not direct parties to this suit. And
while Worcester is generally considered the strongest defense of tribal
sovereignty, it can more accurately be understood as a "defense of federal
over state power., 43 The principals in the case were a group of Christian
missionaries, led by Samuel A. Worcester and Elizur Butler, and the State
of Georgia. Georgia had enacted a law in the early part of 1831 that
prohibited whites from entering Cherokee country without first having
secured a state license. Worcester and Butler, who had entered Cherokee
territory without state authorization, but with tribal and federal approval,
were arrested and later sentenced to four years in prison. The missionaries
immediately retained lawyers who brought suit against Georgia's action to
the Supreme Court, claiming in part that they were agents of the United
States. This raised the question of federal supremacy over state law. Here
was the test case Marshall had been waiting for. The Chief Justice noted
that:
The legislative power of a state, the controlling power of the
constitution and laws of the United States, the rights, if they have
any, the political existence of a once numerous and powerful
people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the
subject now to be considered."
Unlike his indefinite opinion in Cherokee Nation, Marshall
courageously declared that all of Georgia's Indian laws were "repugnant to
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.'45 Lifting text
almost verbatim from Justice Thompson's dissent in Cherokee Nation on
the international status of tribes, Marshall said that "[t]he very fact of
repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the settled doctrine of the law
of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence-its
right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its
43. Newton, supra note 21, at 202.
44. Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 536 (1832).
45. Id. at 561.
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protection." In short, the issue of federal preeminence over state power
regarding Indian tribes was settled, at least for the time being. The Chief
Justice based much of his defense of federal power on his view of Indian
tribes "as distinct, independent political communities." '47 The Constitution
"confers on Congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and
of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for
the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians." '
Worcester epitomizes Marshall's most gallant effort to rectify some of
his previous equivocations. First was the notion of the "doctrine of
discovery," which was ambivalent in both Johnson and Cherokee Nation.
In Worcester, the Chief Justice boldly stated "[i]t is difficult to comprehend
the proposition.., that the discovery of either by the other should give the
discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing
rights of its ancient possessors."49 Discovery was merely "an exclusive
principle which shut out the right of competition among those who had
agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous rights of those who had
not agreed to it."50
On the issue of tribal political status, Marshall attempted to illuminate
the Court's position. In Cherokee Nation, tribes were called "domestic
dependent nations," not on par with "foreign" states."' In Worcester,
however, tribes were referred to as "distinct, independent communities.""
In Marshall's words, "[t]he very term 'nation,' so generally applied to them,
means 'a people distinct from others."'5 3 Marshall noted, "[w]e have
applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the
earth. They are applied to all in the same sense."s' The Court overturned
Georgia's actions and ordered Worcester's release. Worcester, however,
remained in prison until a later deal was struck. Tragically, however, the
majority of the Cherokees and over 100,000 other Indians representing
46. Id at 560-61.
47. Id. at 559.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 543.
50. Id. at 544.
51. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,17 (1831).
52. Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
53. Id
54. Id. at 559-60.
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more than a dozen tribes were eventually coerced into signing treaties
leading to their relocation to Oklahoma.55
E. Mitchel v. United States
Mitchel is an important opinion for indigenous rights which has
received scant attention by legal and political commentators. In part, it has
been largely ignored because most writers have concentrated their attention
on the so-called Marshall "trilogy"--Johnson, Cherokee Nation, and
Worcester. Marshall, possibly because he was near retirement (he stepped
down in July 183 5), opted not to write this decision and assigned it instead
to Justice Henry Baldwin. The Chief Justice did write a brief opening
section in which the Court denied the federal government's motion seeking
a postponement of the Court's verdict.56
Still, Mitchel should be added to the list of cases supporting tribal
sovereignty and indigenous land rights because the Court's holding
fundamentally contradicts the doctrines espoused in Johnson. Mitchel's key
principles include: (1) the doctrine of discovery lacking credibility as a
legal principle; (2) tribes as possessors of a sacrosanct title that is as
important as the fee-simple title of non-Indians; (3) tribes right to alienate
their aboriginal property to whomever they wish, and the question of
whether the non-Indian purchaser has the authorization of a sovereign as a
matter that cannot be used to reduce indigenous rights; (4) the argument
that alleged inferior tribal cultural status, regardless of its differences with
Western culture, does not inhibit aboriginal sovereignty; and finally, (5) that
tribes as collective polities and their members are entitled to international
protections of their recognized treaty rights.57
F. Assessing the Marshall Court's Indian Cases
According to Christopher Wolfe "[p]erhaps the broadest or most radical
criticism of Marshall would be that his whole approach to interpretation
was defective in terms of his own announced ideal: ascertaining and
55. See GRANT FOREMAN, THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIES (10th ed. 1989); H. R. REP. No.
474, 87-89 (1834).
56. See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 723-25 (1835).
57. See David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. M'Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes ofMitchel
v. United States, 19AM. INDIAN L. REV. 159 (1994), for a complete analysis of this decision.
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applying the will of the law rather than executing his own will." 8 Robert
Williams similarly posits that tribal land rights and political status during
the Marshall era were "determined by an intense political conflict that
sacrificed principles and the 'Rule of Law' to interest and expediency."59
John Schmidhauser points out that the major emphasis in decision
making on the Marshall Court was the assertion and maintenance of
national supremacy over the repeated challenges of states' rights activists.'
Joseph Burke, succinctly argues that "the real winner in the Cherokee cause
was the Supreme Court."' These are significant observations. However, the
Marshall Court's impact on tribal sovereignty was even more far reaching.
Tribes emerge from this era in a contradictory political status. On one
hand, there is the idea of tribes having a status resembling that of a ward to
his guardian. On the other hand, tribes are also labeled both as domestic and
dependent nations and as distinct and independent communities. The notion
of wardship, which Marshall employed as an analogy, lacked any historical
basis at the time. The notion of domestic dependency, on the other hand, is
only slightly more realistic, though it too was generally inaccurate at the
time it was announced. The idea of tribes being independent polities,
however, is the most realistic depiction. Vine Deloria sums up the problems
such contradictory statuses caused for tribes:
Since there was no category of "domestic-dependent nations," [in
the Constitution] the result was to affirm federal power over the
Indians but without describing any corresponding set of
responsibilities and, more importantly, without outlining any
standards by which the action-or inaction--of the federal
government could be judged. The Constitution was relevant to
American Indians only to the degree that the courts could identify
where the responsibility for the Indians existed; yet there was
nothing in the Constitution that required the federal government to
fulfill its responsibilities in this regard. 62
58. CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDIcIAL. REVIEW 60 (1986).
59. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Jefferson, The Norman Yoke, andAmerican Indian Lands,
29 ARIZ. L. REV. 166 (1987).
60. See JOHN R. SCHMIDHAusER, THE SUPREMECOURTAS FINAL ARBITORm FEDERAL-
STATE RELATIONS: 1789-1957, at 29-30 (1958).
61. Burke, supra note 23, at 530.
62. Deloria, supra note 16, at 253-54.
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The long-term ramifications of certain Marshall principles-discovery,
the analogy to wardship, and domestic status-have been interpreted as
distinct diminutions of tribal sovereignty. However, other Marshall legal
ideas-the supremacy of Indian treaties, that tribes are independent
communities, that discovery only gave whites preemptive right to purchase
Indian lands, that states are precluded from interfering in tribal affairs, and
that Indian title is as "sacred as" that of Anglo fee-simple---enabled the
sovereignty of tribes to emerge from this era relatively intact. There were,
of course, many examples that could be related when tribal rights were
abused or oppressed-for example, land clashes, trading, and the beginning
of Indian removal. These serious problems notwithstanding, general tribal
status was perceived by each branch of the government as extra-
constitutional and tribal nations continued to be dealt with via the treaty
process, signifying their vitality as nations.
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY & WESTERN EXPANSION, 1835-1860S
The three decades between Mitchel (1835) and the inception of the
American Civil War (1861) were tumultuous years in American history. It
began as an era of constrained and massive Indian removal.63 As noted
earlier, from the mid-1830s to the mid-1840s thousands of eastern (and
other) Indians were required to sign often fraudulent treaties and accept
new lands west of the Mississippi."
The focus of events experienced a dramatic shift beginning in the mid-
1840s and continued through the 1850s. These were the years of "Manifest
Destiny," when America acquired control of large parts of the far west and
unexpectedly, encountered a new Indian frontier.6' This territory included
the annexations of Texas (1845), the acquisition of Oregon (1846), the
1,193,061 square miles of territory involved in the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo with Mexico (1848), and the Gadsden Purchase from Mexico
(1853), which added 29,640 square miles to the western states.6
Within the span of a decade, the country's size increased by 73%.
President Polk in delivering his fourth Annual Message in 1848 stated that
"within the last four years eight important treaties have been negotiated
63. See 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
64. See WOLFE, supra note 58.
65. See ROBERTA. TRENNERT, JR., ALTERNATIVE TO EXTINCTION at vii (1975).
66. See EqCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 450-5 1(Richard Morris ed., 2d rev. ed.
1961).
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with different Indian tribes, and at a cost of $1,842,000; Indian lands to the
amount of more than 18,500,000 acres have been ceded to the United
States. 6
7
Felix S. Cohen, however, accurately notes that while the United States
paid out some fifty million dollars to various foreign nations for all the
continental lands, what the federal government actually acquired "was not
real estate, but simply the power to govern and to tax, the same sort of
power that we gained with the acquisition of Puerto Rico or the Virgin
Islands a century later."'6S
These vast purchases resulted in the physical incorporation into the
nation of scores of previously unknown tribes. The result of this cultural
collision was a congressional Indian policy "conforming more with the
inevitabilities of expansion, one whose most important aspect envisioned
a system of reservations, in which the Indians were to be separated from the
whites in restricted and well-defined areas."'69
The reservation policy, however, was only in its experimental stages
between the 1830s and 1850s, and would not be fully implemented until the
1860s. In fact, treaties, rather than congressional legislation, formed the
bulk of the laws during this era. Nevertheless, Congress, on June 30, 1834,
enacted two comprehensive laws which in most respects "form the fabric
of our law on Indian affairs to this day. ' 7 The first is the final Act in a
series of Acts "to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes."'"
The second, enacted the same day, provided for the organization of the
Department of Indian Affairs.72
Congress, by adopting these laws, developed an "institutional structure
for the ill-defined relationship between [itself] and the Indian tribes."' The
House Committee on Indian Affairs issued a comprehensive and revealing
report analyzing these laws and Congress' embryonic relation to the tribes.
The Committee are [sic] aware of the intrinsic difficulties of the
subject--of providing a system of laws and of the administration,
simple and economical, and, at the same time, efficient and
67. I Israel, supra note 29, at 753-54.
68. Felix S. Cohen, How We Bought the United States, COLLIERS, Jan. 19, 1946, at 23.
69. TRENNERT, supra note 65, at vii.
70. COHEN, supra note 8, at 73.
71. 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
72. See 4 Stat. 735 (1834).
73. Deloria, supra note 16, at 254.
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liberal-that shall be suited to the various conditions and relations
of those for whose benefit it is intended; and that shall, with a due
regard to the rights of our own citizens, meet the just expectations
of the country in the fulfillment of its proper and assumed
obligations to the Indian tribes. Yet, so manifestly defective and
inadequate is our present system, that an immediate revision seems
to be imperiously demanded. What is now proposed is only an
approximation to a perfect system. Much is necessarily left for the
present to Executive discretion, and still more to future
legislation.74
By the late 1840s two additional statutes were enacted having a lasting
effect on tribal affairs. The first Act7 amended the 1834 Non-Intercourse
Act, which had organized the Department of Indian Affairs. The Act
entailed two significant changes in Indian policy. First, the Act stiffened
and broadened the earlier Indian liquor prohibition of annuities to Indian
family heads instead of tribal chiefs.76
Ostensibly designed to reduce the influence of white traders on tribal
leaders, 7 this amendment, in effect "substituted the judgement of federal
officials for that of tribal governments on the question of tribal
membership, so far as the disposition of funds was concerned. This
provision, first in a long series of statutes designed to individualize tribal
property."'
The second Act established the Department of Interior in 1849. 79 It
contained a provision calling for the transfer of the responsibility of Indians
from the War Department to the Interior Department. Supporters of this
transfer prematurely believed that Indian warfare was ending and that as
Indians "transformed from enemies to wards of society, governmental
responsibility rightly belonged in the hands of civilians."'
Although Congress had the constitutional authority to deal with tribal
nations, which it did through sporadic legislation, the Legislature more
74. H.R.REP.No. 474, at 1 (1834).
75. See 9 Stat. 203 (1847).
76. See id
77. See Robert A. Trennert, William Medill: 1845-49, in THE COMMISsIONERS OF
INDIAN AFFAiRs: 1824-1977, at 32 (Robert Kvasnicka & Herman J. Viola eds., 1979).
78. COHEN, supra note 8, at 76.
79. See 9 Stat. 395 (1849).
80. TRENNERT, supra note 65, at 41.
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often deferred to the President and executive branch; especially in the
sensitive area of Indian treaties, which were being negotiated by the dozens
during this period."1
THE TANEY CouRT's INDIAN LAW CASES
Despite the placement of tribes in the Commerce Clause, and despite
a proliferation of Indian treaties, and in contradiction of Supreme Court
precedent in Worcester and Mitchel, Justice Taney in an 1846 ruling,
United States v. Rogers,82 enunciated a wholly fictitious perspective on
tribal political status. Ironically, this unanimous decision, like the Cherokee
cases, also involved the Cherokees. The Cherokees, however, were not
parties to the suit.
William S. Rogers, a white man, residing within Cherokee Indian
Territory, had been indicted in a federal circuit court for the murder of
Jacob Nicholson, also a white man. The crime had occurred in Cherokee
country. A confused circuit court, however, sent the case to the Supreme
Court on a certificate of division. 3
Six questions were certified. First, could a United States citizen
voluntarily cede his allegiance to his country? Second, could a federal
citizen "transfer" his allegiance to another government? Third, was a tribe
"a separate and distinct government" which would enable them to adopt
citizens of other governments? Fourth, could a white person so acting
"become in his social, civil, and political relations and conditions a
Cherokee Indian?" Fifth, did the Twenty-fifth section of the 1834 Trade and
Intercourse Act, which exempted from federal jurisdiction crimes
committed by an Indian against another Indian, apply only to "full-blood"
Indians, or did it also apply to adopted and other persons who resided in
Indian territory? Finally, did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction in this
case?"4
Taney, writing for a unanimous court, "abstain[ed] from giving a
specific answer to each question."" Why? According to the Chief Justice,
81. See KutKE KIcKINGBIRD ET AL., INDiAN TREATiEs 26-27 (1977).
82. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
83. "Certification is a method of taking a case from an appellate court to the Supreme
Court in which the former court asks that some question or interpretation of law be certified,
clarified, or made more certain." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 206 (5th ed. 1979).
84. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 569-70 (1846).
85. Id. at 574.
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simply because "we deem it most advisable not to express an opinion."" In
a sparsely worded opinion, only slightly more than three pages long, Taney
dramatically and incorrectly rewrote the actual history, legal, and political
relationship between tribes and the United States. Contrary to Marshall's
Worcester opinion, Taney wrongly asserted that the Cherokee tribal lands
had "been assigned to them by the United States ... and they hold and
occupy it with the assent of the United States, and under their authority.""7
The Cherokees and the scores of other tribes then negotiating treaties
with the United States were no doubt shocked when they heard Taney's
updated and misinterpreted rendition of the "doctrine of discovery":
The native tribes who were found on this continent at the time of
its discovery have never been acknowledged or treated as
independent nations by the European governments, nor regarded as
the owners of the territories they respectively occupied. On the
contrary, the whole continent was divided and parcelled out, and
granted by the governments of Europe as if it had been vacant and
unoccupied land, and the Indian continually held to be, and treated
as, subject to their dominion and control.8"
This Indian case is also the first Indian law opinion that explicitly cites
the political question doctrine. Justice Taney, shortly after commenting on
the status of Indians as an "unfortunate race," stated that even if Indians had
been mistreated "yet it is a question for the law-making and political
department of the government, and not for the judicial."89
In this era, as noted earlier, Congress was not producing much Indian-
related legislation. In fact, Taney in this instance appears to have set
Congress up as the culprit. Nevertheless, the explicit reference to the
political question doctrine set a stark precedent. In the future, many
legitimate inquiries by tribes would be prematurely quashed as a result of
this decision. Moreover, the tribal right to determine membership was also
severely handicapped by this ruling. As the Court noted, "a white man who
at mature age is adopted in an Indian tribe does not thereby become an
Indian...."
86. Id. at 569-70.
87. Id. at 572.
88. Id.
89. Id
90. Id
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Finally, Robert Trennert has noted that "[w]e sometimes fail to realize
that the formulation of all Indian policies in American history, even the
most just, has been based on certain attitudes that could best be described
as racial."'" Rogers forcefully elucidates this. In holding that Rogers was
not an Indian, the Court asserted that "the exception is confined to those
who by the usages and customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to
their race. It [the 1834 trade and intercourse law] does not speak of
members of a tribe, but of the race generally,--of the family of
Indians ."..92
The Rogers opinion is representative of Supreme Court cases
emphasizing federal dominance over tribes "coupled with references to the
political question doctrine and disregard for both tribal sovereignty and
individual rights."'9 Ironically, Chief Justice Taney, who also wrote the
infamous Dred Scott' opinion handed down seven years after Rogers, said
of tribes in that case that they "were yet a free and independent people,
associated together in nations or tribes."" These Indian governments were
regarded and treated as foreign governments, "as much so as if an ocean
had separated the red man from the white."'
These comments, like many of Taney's remarks in Rogers are dicta.
But which is the more accurate reflection of tribal status in the mid-
nineteenth century? In Rogers, tribes are not and have never been
recognized as independent nations. In Dred Scott, tribes are regarded as the
equals of foreign governments. Taney had already expressed what he
perceived as the status of tribes in Rogers. In Dred Scott, he was accurately
reflecting the tribes literal status in law and politics, but since his words
were dicta he knew they would have no direct bearing on the tribes
relationship with the federal government. He appeared to speak so
glowingly of the Indians merely as a way of foiling the efforts of African-
Americans to gain their legal rights. In short, one minority is used against
another minority for the purposes of supporting the majority.
Three years after the devastating Dred Scott decision, the Supreme
Court was accorded an opportunity to bring some clarity to tribal political
91. TRENNERT, supra note 65, at 1.
92. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 573.
93. Newton, supra note 2 1, at 211.
94. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
95. Id. at 403.
96. Id
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status, at least as defined from a western perspective. Once again, the suit
involved the Cherokee people, though again the tribe was not a direct party.
In Mackey v. Coxe,9" a unanimous court, speaking through Justice
McLean's pen, held that an administrator appointed by a Cherokee Nation
probate court occupied the same position as one appointed by any territory
or state. The Court favorably commented that "[t]he Cherokees are
governed by their own laws. As a people, they are more advanced in
civilization than the other Indian tribes .... ." Recalling earlier treaty
provisions, McLean noted that "whenever [C]ongress shall make provision
on the subject, the Cherokee nation shall be entitled to a delegate in the
national legislature." 9
The Court concluded by stating that the Cherokee Nation and, by
implication, other tribes, had a political status similar to that of domestic
territories. The principal difference being that "the Cherokees enact their
own laws... appoint their own officers, and pay their own expenses. '' °
The sporadic and inconsistent Taney Court decisions, while harmful to
tribal sovereignty, did not have a long term effect that minimized the
concept's force. The Taney Court, unlike the Marshall Court, was more
concerned with "balancing state and federal authority" and exhibited a
"keener awareness of the need to maintain the vitality of the state
governments than had its predecessor.'... And while states' rights activists
tend to be less supportive of tribal rights, during this period there were not
enough confrontations that actually led to radical diminutions of tribal
sovereignty. However, Taney did give life to a new doctrinal concept, the
political question. Although the concept had been ushered in by Marshall,
the Taney Court actually called it into being." 2 Tribal nations still existed
outside the scope of Anglo-American law. Western expansion and the
gradual encirclement of tribes by non-Indians, increased immigration, the
Civil War and Reconstruction, and burgeoning industrialization-fueled in
97. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1856).
98. Id. at 102. The cultural evolution argument used by the Court to support their claim
that the Cherokees "are more advanced" than other tribes is a significant one. The Court
proudly noted that "by the national council their laws are enacted, approved by their
executive, and carried into effect through an organized judiciary." Id.
99. Id at 103.
100. Id.
101. SCHMIDHAuSER, supra note 60, at 78-79.
102. See HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WECEK, EQUAL JUSTICEUNDERTHE LAW:
CONSTnrITIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 84 (1982).
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part by transcontinental railroads, would rapidly terminate this geographical
isolation.
POST-CrviL WAR INDIAN REFORM: 1866-1871
Frederick Jackson Turner noted in 1896 that by the end of the Civil
War "the West would claim the President, Vice President, Chief Justice,
Speaker of the House, Secretary of Treasury, Post-Master General,
Attorney-General, General of the Army, and Admiral of the Navy." 3 How
was this possible? Turner hypothesized that it had occurred because the
West was the "region of action, and in the crisis it took the reins."'"' He
described how the "free lands are gone, the continent is crossed, and all this
push and energy is turning into channels of agitation."" 5
The focus of much of this "agitated" behavior was, as any creditable
history book relates, tribal land, tribal souls, and tribal culture. Within the
span of five years, 1866-1871, there occurred several critical shifts as well
as continuations in federal Indian law and policy. First, the tribes who had
sided with the Confederacy in the Civil War were compelled to negotiate
new treaties by which they surrendered vast areas of their homelands.
Second, Congress authorized an Indian Peace Commission to negotiate
treaties to end the growing hostilities between western tribes and
Americans. 106
Third, in 1869 there was authorized a ten-member Board of Indian
Commissioners. Composed of prominent philanthropists, this unpaid group
of influential eastern citizens was to work closely with the Secretary of
Interior in administering the political relationship between tribes and the
United States. 107 Fourth, President Grant, in an effort to eliminate abuses in
the Indian Office, and as part of the larger plan to assimilate the tribes,
extrapolated his famous "Peace Policy." This policy entailed assigning the
Indian agencies scattered throughout the country to various Christian
denominations. Grant stated: "No matter what ought to be the relations
103. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Problem of the West, ATLANTic MONTHLY, Sept.
1896, at 295.
104. Id
105. Id at 296.
106. See 15 Stat. 17 (1867).
107. See 16 Stat. 13 (1869).
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between such settlements and the aborigines, the fact is they do not
harmonize well, and one or the other has to give way in the end."" °
According to President Grant, "a system which looks to the extinction
of a race is too horrible for a nation to adopt without entailing upon itself
the wrath of all Christendom and engendering in the citizens a disregard for
human life and the rights of other, dangerous to society."" ° It was not,
however, merely the wrath of other civilized nations that propelled the
Grant administration to seek alternatives to wars with the tribes. Economics
and railroads also played key roles.
In a report issued by the Senate's Committee on the Pacific Railroad,
Senator William Stewart (R., Nevada) wrote that tribes "can only be
permanently conquered by railroads. The locomotive is the sole solution of
the Indian question, unless the government changes its system of warfare
and fights the savages the winter through as well as in summer.""
0
Furthermore, Senator Stewart noted that in the last thirty-seven years wars
with tribes had cost the United States 20,000 lives and more than
$750,000,000. In fact, urged Stewart, "the Chairman of the House
Committee on Indian Affairs estimated recently that the present current
expenses of our warfare with the Indians was $1,000,000 a week-
$144,000 a day.""' Grant's "Peace Policy," it was believed, could do no
worse, and would undoubtedly be far less expensive and more morally
upright.
The fifth and most important modification in Indian policy centered on
the subject of whether or not to continue the treaty process with tribal
nations. The rapidity of western expansion had forced federal officials to
rethink their Indian policy. Treaty-making thus came under fire.
Commissioner D.N. Cooley, in his 1866 Indian Affairs Annual Report,
noted that peace could best be maintained with tribes by treaty
arrangements and he urged "the continuance of the policy which has met
with such gratifying success during the present and last year.""2 The next
year, however, a section of an 1867 law (repealed a few months later)
prohibited Indian treaties "until an appropriation authorizing such expense
108. II Israel, supra note 29, at 1199.
109. Id at 1199-1200.
110. S. REP. No. 219, at 15 (1869).
111. Id
112. 1866 COMM'R INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP. 15, microformed on Native American Legal
Materials Collection, Title 4163 (Law Library Microform Consortium).
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shall be first made by law."' This set the tone for a vigorous period of
debate between the two houses of Congress on the role of the House, and
the need for the treaty process in general. It was, interestingly enough, a
debate having little direct impact with the political status of tribes.
In his Annual Report for 1869, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Ely
S. Parker, a Seneca Indian, rekindled the treaty debate. He believed that the
treaty process with tribes should be closed, although he agreed that treaties
already in force should be faithfully executed." 4 In debate on a bill
introduced in the House in March, 1870, Representative Aaron Sargent (R.,
CA) asserted that the House would "claim the right, as a large part of the
money-appropriating power of this Government, to determine whether
contracts binding Congress and the Nation shall or shall not be made."''
The following year, on February 11, 1871, Representative William
Armstrong (R., PA) introduced the following resolution:
That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an
independent nation, tribe, or power, with whom the United States
may contract by treaty; and all treaties or agreements hereafter
made by and between them, or any of them, and the United States
shall be subject to the approval of Congress: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall be considered to invalidate or impair
the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified
with any such Indian nation or tribe."6
This House resolution, except for the important underscored passage,
which was later deleted, was attached as an amendment to the Interior
Department's 1872 appropriation bill. Immediately it came under intense,
bipartisan scrutiny. The most articulate critiques against the amendment
came from three Senators: Garrett Davis (D., KY), Samuel Pomeroy (R.,
KA), and Eugene Casserly (D., CA). They attacked the measure using solid
political, legal, and moral arguments. Messr's Davis and Pomeroy took a
constitutional position and vehemently argued that because the treaty-
making power was lawfully vested by the Constitution in the President and
113. 15 Stat. 7,9(1867).
114. See 1869 COMM'R INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP. 448, microformed on Native American
Legal Materials Collection, Title 4163 (Law Library Microform Consortium).
115. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1638 (1870).
116. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d. Sess. 1154(1871) (emphasis added).
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Senate, the House had no power to be involved in the process except to pass
the necessary appropriation bills to execute the treaties.' 
7
Mr. Pomeroy said:
It would be difficult by a law of Congress to limit the power of the
President and Senate over treaties as provided in the Constitution
... Now, you come in here on an appropriation bill, and by an act
of Congress prohibit that power, contract it, limit it, when no law
can have anything to do with it. It is a sort of toadyism to the House
of Representatives; that is my objection to it."'8
Mr. Casserly, more prophetically, made this observation:
I think I understand this subject. I know what the misfortune of the
tribe is. Their misfortune is not that they are red men; not that they
are semi-civilized; not that they are a dwindling race; not that they
are a weak race. Their misfortune is that they hold great bodies of
rich lands, which have aroused the cupidity of powerful
corporations and of powerful individuals... It [adoption of the
amendment] is the first step in a great scheme of spoliation, in
which the Indians will be plundered, corporations and individuals
enriched, and the American name dishonored in history." 9
Despite these arguments, the Amendment was approved.
Representative Sargent (R., CA) proudly noted that the adoption of this
measure had three beneficial results: It ended, what he termed, an
"improvident system," it would save the federal government millions of
dollars, and finally, it gave the House a voice in the process of negotiations
with tribes.12
Although the treaty process, so named, was unilaterally discontinued,
the substance of treaty-making continued in the form of House and Senate
approved "agreements" between tribes and the United States. Nevertheless,
the ending of the treaty process signaled a real transformation in the form
of diplomatic relations between tribes and the United States and presaged
major problems for tribes and the tribal-federal relationship. Commissioner
117. See id. at 1822.
118. Id.
119. Id at 1825.
120. Seeid at 1811.
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Francis A. Walker, in his 1872 Indian Affairs Annual Report, posed several
interesting questions: What of tribal rights to lands which had not been
covered by treaty? What about tribes who had not yet been treated with, but
who had the same political standing as treaty tribes? How was the federal
government legally going to secure title to tribal lands it desired.'
The answer, of course, was in the negotiation of bilateral "agreements."
However, although negotiations leading to diplomatic arrangements
continued, the 1871 Amendment represented a novel and dangerous way of
perceiving the political relationship between tribes and the federal
government. And although Congress continued to authorize commissions
to negotiate agreements, it could, when it so desired, simply enact statutes
which did not require tribal consent.12
This modification created "a feeling of betrayal among the Indians and
vested dictatorial powers in the Indian agents, who were no longer seen as
advocates for the tribes but as antagonists who sought to force change and
destroy tribal customs and practices."'"
THE CHASE COURT'S INDIAN-LAW CASES BEFORE TREATY
TERMINATION
In United States v. Holliday,24 a case involving federal liquor laws, the
Supreme Court held that the laws prohibiting liquor sales to Indians were
applicable even if the sale occurred outside the confines of a reservation.
The Court, speaking unanimously through Justice Miller, relied on the
Commerce Clause as postulated in Gibbons, stating that "if commerce, or
traffic, or intercourse, is carried on with an Indian tribe, or with a member
of such a tribe, it is subject to be regulated by Congress, although within the
limits of a state." 21
In Kansas Indians26 the question was whether the State of Kansas had
the right to tax Indian lands held in severalty by individual Indians of three
121. See 1872 COMM'RINDIALN AFF. ANN. REP. 471, microformed on Native American
Legal Materials Collection, Title 4163 (Law Library Microform Consortium).
122. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Congress in Its Wisdom: The Course of Indian Legislation,
in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIvILIZATION 107 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds.,
1984).
123. Deloria, supra note 16, at 255.
124. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866).
125. Id. at419.
126. In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867).
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different tribes: the Shawnees, Wea, and Miami. Individuals of these tribes
had received land patents under treaties and federal law. Kansas believed
it was entitled to tax and had already confiscated the lands of Indians who
did not pay the state's real property tax. In fact, the aggregate amount of
taxes on just the Shawnee lands alone in 1866 amounted to over $60,000.127
An equal point of importance dealt with the larger issue of individual
Indian citizenship under the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. Commissioner Cooley said "it is claimed
that if the final decisioi is in favor of the right to tax these Indians, they
then become, by virtue of the civil rights bill of last session, citizens of the
United States."'M
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously held that Kansas had no
right to tax Indian lands. Reaffirming Worcester's federal supremacy
principle, Justice Davis noted that:
[I]f the tribal organization of the Shawnees is preserved intact, and
recognized by the political departments of the government as
existing, then they are a "people distinct from others," capable of
making treaties, separated from the jurisdiction of Kansas, and to
be governed exclusively by the government of the Union.
29
Compare this essentially "political" definition of tribal status with the
explicit "race-based" definition of tribal and Indian status enunciated in
Rogers.
Furthermore, the Court said that just because the Indians started their
suit in state courts this did not make them subject to state law. "[T]he
conduct of Indians is not to be measured by the same standard, which we
apply to the conduct of other people." 3' Tribes, Justice Davis said, are
separate peoples, with separate governments, who receive the protection of
the federal government. This protection of tribes did not include a federal
right to unilaterally alter tribal status or rights. As the Court observed, tribal
rights could only be modified "by treaty stipulation, or a voluntary
abandonment of their tribal organization."''
127. See 1866 COMM'R INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP. 19, maicroformed on Native American
Legal Materials Collection, Title 4163 (Law Library Microform Consortium).
128. Id.
129. Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 755.
130. Id. at 758.
131. Id at 757.
20001
Oklahoma City University Law Review
Ten days after Kansas Indians was decided, the Supreme Court issued
another equally impressive and similar ruling on the federal government's
preeminent role in the field of Indian affairs. In New York Indians,' the
Supreme Court, again unanimously, held that New York's attempts to tax
Seneca Indian lands on three different reservations was "illegal and void as
in conflict with the tribal rights of the Seneca nation as guaranteed to it by
treaties with the United States.' 33
Justice Nelson, citing the rationale of the recent Kansas Indians
decision, forcefully noted that the exercise of state taxing authority over the
Senecas was "an unwarrantable interference, inconsistent with the original
title of the Indians, and offensive to their relations.' 34
CONCLUSION
This lengthy analysis was necessary to elucidate the prevalent attitudes,
pertinent laws, and judicial precedents of the United States. In the broad
cultural and political/legal landscape painted, this Article tries to show that,
in general, tribes and the United States, unlike the relationship between
African-Americans and the federal government, were still virtual strangers
in a strict constitutional and legal sense. Throughout this period, it has been
illustrated how the Supreme Court enunciated a conflicting bevy of legal
principles: tribes are "tenants" not owners of their soil, or, tribes are the true
owners of their lands; tribes are domestic-dependent nations, or, tribes are
distinct and independent nations; tribes resemble "wards," or, tribes have
a national status which equals that of foreign governments.
The contention is that despite these conflicting judicial doctrines, in a
fundamental political sense tribal sovereign status remained relatively intact
although it had certainly been assaulted. A compelling piece of evidence
supporting this view is contained in a report issued by the Senate Judiciary
Committee in December, 1870, a mere three months before the treaty
termination rider. 3 ' The Committee, by Senate resolution, had been
instructed to ascertain the effect of the recently adopted Fourteenth
Amendment on tribes and tribal citizens. Specifically, were tribal Indians
now citizens of the United States? And, had Indian treaties been invalidated
132. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867).
133. Id. at 772.
134. Jdat77l.
135. See S. REP. No. 268 (1870).
[Vol. 25
A Constitutional Conundrum
by the Amendment? Senator Matthew Carpenter (R., WI) chaired the
Committee and authored the final report.
In a detailed eleven page report, written in part to "fix more clearly in
the minds of Congress and the people the true theory of our relations to
these unfortunate tribes," the Committee elaborately analyzed the historical
relationship between tribes and the United States.36 In fact, Senator
Carpenter stated pointedly that such a report was warranted because of the
existence of some "loose popular notions of modem date in regard to the
power of the President and Senate to exercise the treaty making power." '
Perusing treaties, statutes, Supreme Court decisions, and gauging
popular opinion, the Committee report determined that the Fourteenth
Amendment had no effect on tribal status and that Indian treaties had not
been annulled by its creation. The nature of the reportjustifies an extended
quotation:
Volumes of treaties, acts of Congress almost without number, the
solemn adjudications of the highestjudicial tribunal of the republic,
and the universal opinion of our statesmen and people, have united
to exempt the Indian, being a member of a tribe recognized by, and
having treaty relations with, the United States from the operation
of our laws, and the jurisdiction of our courts. Whenever we have
dealt with them, it has been in their collective capacity as a state,
and not with their individual members, except when such members
were separated from the tribe to which they belonged; and then we
have asserted such jurisdiction as every nation exercised over the
subjects of another independent sovereign nation entering its
territory and violating its laws.
[Thus] [tlo maintain that the United States intended, by a
change of its fundamental law, which was not ratified by these
tribes, and to which they were neither requested nor permitted to
assent, to annul treaties then existing between the United States as
one party, and the Indian tribes as the other parties respectively,
would be to charge upon the United States repudiation of national
obligations, repudiation doubly infamous from the fact that the
parties whose claims were thus annulled are too weak to enforce
136. Id. at 11.
137. Id.
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their just rights, and were enjoying the voluntarily assumed
guardianship protection of this Government. 38
In short, a fundamental nation-to-nation relationship still persisted.
Thus, despite forced Indian removal, the sometimes fraudulent treaty
negotiations, the beginnings of the reservation period, and the equivocal
language in several Supreme Court opinions penned by Chief Justices
Marshall and Taney and the few case court rulings, the preponderance of
political and legal evidence shows that the essence, if not always the
exercise of tribal sovereignty, generally retained a vital force. Federal
acknowledgment of tribal status would be pummeled, however, during the
next half-century, beginning with the enactment of the General Allotment
Act of 1887"'1 which established the goal of the individualization of tribal
property as the cornerstone of a policy designed to assimilate Indian people
into the American polity.
Ironically, even as tribal land liquidation was taking place, and as
assimilation was continuing unabated, there were sporadic episodes of
federal activity that still reflected the sovereignty of tribal nations. In 1896,
for example, on the same day the Supreme Court handed down Plessy v.
Ferguson""4 which established the "separate but equal" doctrine and
sanctioned state "Jim Crow" laws, the Court by an identical majority, 8-1
(with Harlan dissenting in both), held in Talton v. Mayes" that the United
States Constitution's Fifth Amendment did not apply to tribes because their
sovereignty existed prior to the Constitution and was dependent upon the
will of the Indian people and not the will of the American public. Decisions
like Talton recognize and affirm the ongoing political sovereignty of tribal
nations, a status no other racial or ethnic minority group in the United States
possess.
138. Id atIO-11.
139. 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
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